In his first public comments since stepping down as US ambassador to Syria on Friday, Robert Ford addressed the failure to contain Syria’s bloody civil war, laying most of the blame at the feet of President Bashar al-Assad and his government’s international backers.
\nSpeaking at a conference at Tufts University last night, his outlook was bleak, warning that a fractured rebellion, the presence of Al Qaeda inspired fighters on the battlefield, and the fears of the country’s minorities are a recipe for prolonged conflict.<\/p>\n
\u201cYou have one Al Qaeda faction fighting another Al Qaeda faction. That\u2019s how fractured this is. One sharp sliver fighting another sharp sliver,\u201d he said, a measure of disbelief in his voice. \u201cI bring no good news to you tonight about Syria.\u201d<\/p>\n
His remarks had seven key takeaways.<\/p>\n
1. It\u2019s the regime\u2019s fault.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Ford placed the blame for the failure of two rounds of peace talks in Geneva squarely on the regime. Citing private comments by the United Nations special envoy to Syria, he said:<\/p>\n \u201cThe major reason for the deadlock, I want to be clear with everyone here. The mediator, Lakhdar Brahimi, who has decades, decades of experience negotiating transitions and negotiating cease-fires, negotiating political settlements\u2026 was extremely clear as to what was the problem. He said it is \u2013 and this is a quote \u2013 100 percent the fault of Jaafari,\u201d he said, referring to Syria\u2019s UN ambassador, Bashar Jaafari, who led the regime delegation at peace talks.<\/p>\n \u201cI\u2019ll give you this little detail about it. Most of the discussions behind closed doors were the regime throwing out insults at the opposition delegation, basically saying they weren\u2019t representative.\u201d<\/p>\n 2. But the opposition isn’t helping its cause.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Assad\u2019s Alawite support base is much shakier than it appears, Ford said, noting that there have been anti-government demonstrations even in his family hometown of Qerdaha. What keeps the Alawites and other minorities from deserting is a genuine fear that they will be massacred by foreign terrorists if Assad falls. Only the opposition can assuage those fears, he said.<\/p>\n \u201cThe Syrian opposition itself has done a miserable job distinguishing itself from the Al Qaeda elements. There are some really bad people in Syria right now, on the opposition side. Can the opposition show that it is willing to reach out and figure out a way security-wise and politics-wise to reunify across that sectarian divide?\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \u201cThe sooner the opposition does that, the faster Assad\u2019s support base will crumble.\u201d<\/p>\n At the last round of talks, international representatives were surprised at the number of messages they got from Damascus saying that they hoped the talks succeeded. \u201cEven in the Alawi community, they want an out. They don\u2019t like where they are,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n 3. Armed groups will have to be at the table \u2013 even jihadis.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The US relationship with the opposition\u2019s armed groups has deepened. Four representatives of such groups \u2013 \u201cnot the terrorist groups,\u201d Ford was careful to say \u2013 were at Geneva II. He would not specify which ones.<\/p>\n The US believes more of that needs to be happening. The consent to negotiations from groups like the Saudi-backed Islamist Front, a collection of jihadi brigades, puts that within reach, according to Ford.<\/p>\n \u201cYou can\u2019t have a negotiation, a serious negotiation, without negotiating with the people who have the guns. This is a war, so they\u2019re going to have to be brought in,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n That inclusion should extend to the regime side. The Syrian Army and other regime forces; the Lebanese Shiite militant group, Hezbollah, which has sent thousands of fighters to Syria to fight on behalf of the regime; and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is less overtly but still seriously assisting the regime; will all have to be represented, he said.<\/p>\n 4. Iran, too.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The handling of Iran\u2019s invitation to Geneva II was \u201ca mess,\u201d Ford acknowledged, referring to the chain of events that led to Iran being preemptively issued an invitation to Geneva II. It was revoked just before the talks collapsed because of an opposition boycott.<\/p>\n \u201cI think the Iranians would have been saying to them in private, \u2018Hold fast. Make no concessions. We\u2019re with you.\u2019 I don\u2019t think we lost anything,\u201d Ford said, referring to the fact that Iran was absent.<\/p>\n But Iran has more influence over Syria than any other country, as well as real interests in keeping Assad in power, so while its inclusion is unlikely to deliver a more desirable outcome \u2013 for the international community, at least — it\u2019s going to be have to be at the table in the future.<\/p>\n 5. Could the US use military force in Syria?<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The US threat of a military strike last year resulted in a chemical weapons agreement because Syria and its Russian backer believed the US meant it. Ford warned that such credibility could be easily squandered if the US threatened military involvement again without being willing to follow through \u2013 whatever the unpredictable end.<\/p>\n \u201cWhat the president will decide, I\u2019m not sure, but I do know that this factor weighs in discussions. If we do use kinetic force, and the civil war doesn\u2019t end\u2026 people are going to say, \u2018Well, now what are you going to do?\u2019 You end up having to escalate. That, I think, gives the president great pause,\u201d Ford said.<\/p>\n \u201cI think he would like to understand if we start, what do we achieve? And if we have to escalate, how do we control where we\u2019re going? It\u2019s very hard to say we\u2019ve got it all covered, Mr. President,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n But President Obama is not afraid of using military force, he asserts.<\/p>\n \u201cHe took a chance on Bin Laden and got great results,\u201d he said. \u201cI don\u2019t want to say the United States will never use force in Syria. I don\u2019t believe it.\u201d<\/p>\n 6. Assad should not run in June presidential elections.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Assad has assured the Syrians that he will run in presidential elections scheduled for June. That can\u2019t happen, Ford said.<\/p>\n \u201cI can\u2019t in any way imagine circumstances where most of the fighters who are now fighting against the regime or the countries that are backing them\u2026 are going to stand down if Assad remains,\u201d he said.<\/p>\n \u201cOne man should not hold a country hostage,” he said.<\/p>\n Syria is not ready for elections this summer, period, he said. With 9 million displaced and no history of free elections, they would have no credibility.<\/p>\n 7. The end game is a bunch of cantons controlled by armed local factions.<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n So what happens?<\/p>\n Ford was unsparing in his summary: The state is \u201clittle by little collapsing.\u201d It lacks the manpower to take back places like Raqaa province and Deir al-Zour, or the Kurdish north. The foreign fighters the regime increasingly relies on cannot be compelled to take on that fight. But neither can the opposition overcome the regime in much of the country.<\/p>\n The most likely end game? De-facto cantons, some of them controlled by local armed factions. Certainly nothing like the Syria Ford saw when he arrived in Damascus in 2010.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In his first public comments since stepping down as US ambassador to Syria on Friday, Robert Ford addressed the failure to contain Syria’s bloody civil war, laying most of the blame at the feet of President Bashar al-Assad and his government’s international backers. 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